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# Optimizely Supply Chain Attack: How 178 Organizations Exposed Crypto Addresses
- URL: https://blog.era-wallet.com/optimizely-supply-chain-attack/
- Published: 2026-11-17T06:47:59.000Z
- Updated: 2026-11-17T06:47:59.000Z
- Description: Malicious Optimizely scripts reached 178 organizations, swapping crypto addresses and collecting payment data. See how the attack worked and what to verify before sending funds.
- Author: ERA WALLET
- Tags: Cybersecurity, Crypto Security, Exploits

On November 16, 2026, a supply chain attack turned trusted websites into potential tools for stealing cryptocurrency. Malicious JavaScript delivered through Optimizely affected 178 organizations, including BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, and GitLab. The script could replace wallet addresses with attacker-controlled ones, allowing visitors to copy payment details from legitimate pages and unknowingly send funds to someone else.

The attacker exploited third-party code trusted by websites; HTTPS could not validate a copied destination.

## How the Optimizely Supply Chain Attack Unfolded

Optimizely Web lets companies run A/B tests and personalize websites by loading JavaScript from Optimizely's infrastructure. The code runs in visitors' browsers with access to page content.

Security researcher Scott Helme of Report URI [identified 188 infected JavaScript files](https://report-uri.ghost.io/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/?ref=blog.era-wallet.com) associated with 178 organizations after examining 1,611 Optimizely scripts. 

The infected scripts loaded track.js from the attacker-controlled domain 1688360.cc. The additional payload contained several functions:

- **Crypto address replacement:** Substituting attacker-controlled wallet addresses in page content and copying operations.
- **Payment card theft:** Capturing card numbers, expiration dates, and security codes from accessible payment forms.
- **Browser data collection:** Extracting accessible cookies and screenshots under certain conditions.
- **iOS targeting:** Loading additional components on iPhones and iPads, including infrastructure associated with exploit chains.

Investigators confirmed the delivery of malicious code through third-party scripts. The initial method used to change the files has not been publicly established.

## How the November 16 Attack Developed

[StepSecurity's analysis](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/optimjack-optimizely-hosted-scripts-crypto-clipper-card-skimmer?ref=blog.era-wallet.com) documented changes to the payload throughout November 16\. 

November 16 Incident Timeline (UTC)

1. 08:28  
First Public Capture  
A public scan recorded contact with the malicious payload server.
2. 16:02  
Payload Analyzed  
A captured version contained approximately 28.9 KB of malicious JavaScript.
3. 17:56  
Expanded Payload  
An updated version included additional functionality and iOS-related infrastructure.
4. 21:32  
Cleanup Underway  
Researchers observed the count of infected files declining.
5. 21:52  
Most Files Cleaned  
Only one of the 188 identified files remained infected in Report URI checks.
Replay 

Because the malicious functionality loaded remotely, the operator could update its behavior without modifying every affected website again.

## How Clipboard Hijacking Crypto Attacks Work

Imagine sending Bitcoin to an address published on an official website. You check the domain, recognize the page, and click Copy. A clipboard hijacker can intercept the copied value and substitute the attacker's address. The destination pasted into your wallet then differs from the one you intended.

The Optimizely payload went further. According to [StepSecurity](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/optimjack-optimizely-hosted-scripts-crypto-clipper-card-skimmer?ref=blog.era-wallet.com), it could replace addresses in page text, inputs, links, copy events, clipboard functions, and certain requests. Its targets included Bitcoin, Ethereum, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash, and Dogecoin.

The displayed address and copied address could both be malicious. Comparing them would produce a match without proving that either belonged to the intended recipient.

### Why HTTPS Doesn't Prevent a JavaScript Supply Chain Attack

HTTPS protects a connection but does not certify every third-party script loaded by the page. External scripts can interact with website content.

This differs from crypto address poisoning, in which attackers commonly plant lookalike addresses in transaction histories. It also differs from traditional clipboard hijacker malware installed on a computer: this malicious behavior could run within an open browser page.

## How Much Crypto Was Stolen?

StepSecurity [estimated approximately $6,600](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/optimjack-optimizely-hosted-scripts-crypto-clipper-card-skimmer?ref=blog.era-wallet.com) in cryptocurrency receipts and holdings associated with identified attacker wallets. This is not a confirmed campaign loss: some wallets had earlier activity, and blockchain records cannot attribute each transfer.

Card data theft, browser exfiltration, and possible iOS compromises would not appear in those balances. The delivery method could reach visitors to unrelated organizations.

## How to Protect Your Crypto Wallet From Address Replacement

### 1\. Verify the Recipient Independently

For a payment to another person, confirm the receiving address through a separate, previously trusted channel. Do not use the same potentially compromised page as both the source and reference.

For a transfer to your own hardware wallet, generate the receiving address through your device's receiving workflow. Our guide to [verifying a crypto receiving address](https://blog.era-wallet.com/verify-crypto-receiving-address-hardware-wallet/) explains how to compare it with the address displayed in the application.

### 2\. Compare the Complete Address

Checking only the first and last characters may catch simple errors, but sophisticated lookalike addresses can share them. Compare the full destination with independently verified details wherever practical, and confirm the asset and blockchain network.

### 3\. Understand What You're Signing With ERA Lens

Even when a browser or clipboard contains a substituted address, the transaction must still be reviewed before signing. On ERA Wallet device, [ERA Lens](https://guide.era-wallet.com/06-sign-overview.html?ref=blog.era-wallet.com) is an offline transaction decoder and analysis system that turns supported raw transaction data into readable information on the device's screen.

Instead of relying on opaque transaction data, users can inspect the recipient, amount, network, fee, and available warnings. ERA Lens also analyzes supported smart contract interactions, including token approvals, multicall operations, and account delegation through EIP-7702\. Potentially risky permissions and other recognized concerns can be highlighted before signing.

Its **Overview** displays essential transaction actions and warnings; **Details** provides technical fields. In an address-substitution scenario, this gives users a separate screen on which to inspect the actual destination and compare it with an address obtained independently, rather than relying entirely on the browser or software wallet.

### 4\. Test a Transfer, Then Check Again

A small test transaction can confirm that funds reached a particular address, but does not verify the destination of the next payment. If you copy the address again, the larger transfer could still be redirected. Our explanation of [Bitcoin test transactions](https://blog.era-wallet.com/bitcoin-test-transaction-safe-large-transfer/) covers what a successful test does and does not establish.

## What If You Visited an Affected Website?

Visiting an affected page does not establish that funds were stolen or a device compromised. Exposure depends on which code loaded and what actions were performed.

If you copied payment details from a potentially affected page, inspect the destination in your outgoing transaction history and compare it with independent records. If you entered card details, review activity and contact your bank if you suspect compromise. iOS users should install available security updates.

## Checklist Before a Large Crypto Transfer

- **Recipient:** Confirm the address through an independent source.
- **Network:** Check that the asset and blockchain match.
- **Destination:** Compare the complete address wherever practical.
- **Signature:** Review recipient, amount, and other available details on the signing device.
- **Test:** Verify the destination again before the main transfer.

## FAQ: The Optimizely Supply Chain Attack

Which Websites Were Affected by the Optimizely Attack?

Report URI identified 188 infected JavaScript files associated with 178 organizations, including BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, and GitLab.

Was Optimizely Itself Hacked?

Malicious code was delivered through Optimizely-hosted JavaScript, but the initial method of modifying the files has not been publicly established.

How Much Cryptocurrency Was Stolen?

StepSecurity identified approximately $6,600 in related cryptocurrency receipts and balances. Losses attributable to the campaign remain uncertain.

How to Stop Clipboard Hijacking?

Verify the destination against an independently obtained address and review the actual transaction details before signing.

Can a Hardware Wallet Prevent Clipboard Hijacking?

A trusted signing screen helps detect a wrong destination before signing. It does not stop replacement in the browser or verify who owns an address.

## The Bottom Line

The Optimizely incident showed how malicious third-party JavaScript can alter information presented on legitimate sites without changing their domains or accessing cryptocurrency private keys. Before authorizing a transfer, compare its actual destination against independently obtained information. Matching details from the browser and clipboard alone do not establish who controls an address.

![ERA Wallet hardware wallet](https://d2j6dbq0eux0bg.cloudfront.net/images/109120894/products/713258606/5773934693.webp)

Check the recipient on the device before you sign.

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